

SECRET

3 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Training (via DD/S)
SAVA
D/PPB

Attached is a draft memorandum to the
Director on which I should appreciate your comments before forward-
ing it to him.

25X1



W. E. Colby


Attachment

State Dept. review completed.



ILLEGIB

SECRET



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Countersubversion - A Continuing CIA Responsibility


1. The attached obviously stems in great part from my Vietnam experience, but through a series of talks here and in other agencies I have confirmed my impression that this subject generally is falling between departmental and agency stools. I suggest that a new effort in this field would be important, would be within the limits of political permissibility, and would be a fitting element of the Nixon doctrine.

2. I have long believed that we missed an opportunity to forestall the Vietnam war in the late 1950's by not developing a comprehensive approach to countersubversion, despite the lip service given it in the SEATO treaty and successful component programs in a few countries. Looking to the future, I suggest the need will still exist to forestall political setbacks from various breeds of extremism. Such programs can be conducted discreetly and can (and must) be structured to include politically desirable elements such as the propagation of the rule of law.

3. While the Agency would have an important role in any such new start, it would be by no means exclusive, and the prime stimulus should lie with the NSC. It would require, however, that we take a look at our own organizational vehicles for our part of the effort. My own predilection would be to assign a major role to SOD. In so doing, SOD would be assisted in its efforts to remain "relevant" to current Agency responsibilities, would increase its involvement in intelligence activity, and at the same time could exploit its considerable qualifications in the paramilitary field. SOD would also provide a focus for the compilation of our experience and for consciously testing new techniques

25X1 [redacted] functions now dispersed among FI and CI Staffs and the operating divisions. DDI in turn would be pressed to provide solid assessments and possibly level new collection requirements to permit analysis in the depth really required. There may be a role for the development of a group (within OSR ?) focused on subversion as distinct from military matters - perhaps utilizing some of those OER analysts who have so effectively handled the Southeast Asia military

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

and guerrilla account over the past few years. (Again in hindsight, I believe the relative absence of such analysis of what Hanoi was really doing in the late 1950's contributed to our failure to develop proper countermeasures at that time.) The need for a positive program to expand the rule of law could involve a number of CA aspects. Particular attention would also be necessary in OTR to support a comprehensive program along these lines, to insure its inclusion in the doctrine being taught our operational personnel of the future.

4. An additional implication for CIA would be the clear definition of its role and its relationships with other agencies in such a new start. Clearly the main focus should be on intelligence coverage of the threat. The "Order of Battle" coverage could hopefully be developed [redacted]

[redacted] rather than directly by CIA. CIA could ideally feed off this coverage to obtain summarized information for DDI (the propagation of computer use offers considerable potential in this area) and leads to strategic-level penetrations. There would also be a role for CIA in some areas in covert influence [redacted]

[redacted] These activities should be coordinated with State [redacted] and the military to the maximum degree possible to avoid CIA's being saddled with the whole job, although this may involve complex jurisdictional problems in some areas. Their frank resolution, however, is preferable to the present dropping of important aspects of the problem between U. S. bureaucratic stools.

5. In short, I suggest the need for a continuing focus on countersubversion as one of CIA's major responsibilities in the years to come, collaborating with other agencies under NSC direction. If you concur, I suggest:

a. Forwarding the attached memoranda (or a revision thereof) to Dr. Kissinger, Jack Irwin, Alex Johnson, Byron Engle, Rod O'Connor, Warren Nutter, and any others appropriate for consideration of NSC and interagency action.

b. Requesting DDP to task SOD with the development of CIA doctrine on this subject, supported by DDI, and the CS operating divisions for implementing programs.

W. E. Colby

Attachments

~~SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

25X1


1. Some of our people have been considering the degree to which Communist and other extremist subversion may be of concern to us abroad in the coming years and the way we are organized to meet it. They have developed the attached memorandum and annex, discussing an over-all approach

2. I forward it to you with the suggestion that the NSC Staff review it and consult about it with State, DOD, AID, and us with a view to formulating specific recommendations on the subject for the NSC.

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment
As Stated

SECRET



SECRET

29 December 1971

COUNTERSUBVERSION - A CONTINUING NEED

1. Counterespionage (identifying and frustrating the activities of foreign intelligence services) is a well-defined activity, responsibility for which is clearly assigned within the intelligence community.

Counterinsurgency was subjected to a great deal of analysis during the early 1960's and in good part has been reduced to doctrine. Its application was overtaken in good part by the mammoth scale of the Vietnam war effort (the inadequacies or failures of early counterinsurgency efforts perhaps having led to the increase in that scale). It has also suffered from a persistent organizational problem within the U. S. Government as to the appropriate mix of civilian and military involvement in counterinsurgency (a problem not fully resolved by field expedients such as CORDS). In the climate of the present time, however, it can be anticipated that calls for further U. S. engagement in counterinsurgency will be limited. Reflection upon the lessons of Southeast Asia should permit the development of necessary organizational patterns for future requirements of this nature.

2. Countersubversion, however, has never been clearly articulated, and its role has been somewhat inundated by the scale and clamor of counterinsurgency and military contest. A careful examination,

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

however, can show that it is of continuing importance as we move into the 1970's. A major danger is that its potential could be swept away in the ebbing tide of U. S. willingness to contemplate U. S. military or counterinsurgency involvement abroad.

3. Properly defined, countersubversion should involve six areas of effort and the organizations and programs necessary to implement them:

a. Collection of intelligence on subversive forces.

Just as with military forces, this should include "Order of Battle" intelligence on subversive elements (organization, strength, training, doctrine, etc.), plus higher level strategic intelligence on intentions and capabilities.

25X1

25X1

b. Assessment of the capabilities and intentions of the subversive force and its likelihood of success in the political, psychological, and security atmosphere of the target country.

c. Institutional barriers, to include normal police patrolling and law-and-order functions, population registration measures, identification records, etc.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

d. Countersubversion forces and programs, such as emergency legislation, police paramilitary elements, controls on population and resource movements, rewards, detention regulations and facilities, etc.

e. Information. Programs to inform the population of the nature of the subversive threat and of the effectiveness and propriety of the measures taken to counter it. This must invite the active participation of the population.

f. The rule of law. The availability and utilization of legal and judicial procedures and facilities to ensure that countersubversion is conducted under politically and morally justifiable standards, which is essential to public support and assistance.

4. Countersubversion is no panacea in itself. To achieve results, it should be complemented by an energetic positive political program, a momentum of development in the economic field, and the availability of reinforcement by military strength should the need arise. It is nonetheless a clearly identifiable field of importance in many nations whose continued development is in the interests of the U. S. If it is effective, and it has been in a number of areas, it can forestall the development of more critical situations which might

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

require more extensive responses. If it is not, a subversive force can build strength in spite of a relatively favorable political, economic, and military climate. At the same time, it can be conducted with a minimum of U. S. engagement and support, in full compliance with the precepts of the Nixon Doctrine. It is of course applicable against Communist subversion, but it can be equally effective against other forms of extremist subversion outside the constitutional order. While some of its techniques could be used by repressive governments, an American program of assistance to countersubversion should include as an integral element the active propagation of the rule of law and the full involvement of the population as essentials, without which repressive acts alone could be predicted to be ineffective, aside from their undesirability. Lastly, its costs could be minimal, primarily involving advising on doctrine, intelligence collaboration

25X1 with none of the higher expenditures common to economic and military assistance programs.

5. It can be contended that the United States is currently assisting many countersubversion programs. This is true in somewhat the same fashion as it was true that the United States was engaged in many counterinsurgency programs in the early 1960's. Unfortunately, these many programs were not integrated into comprehensive strategies, as

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

a result of which the individual program increments frequently were conducted without substantial relevance either to the over-all problem or to ongoing but related programs in the same area. Individual U. S. agencies at that time devoted varying degrees of energy to counterinsurgency, conducting each program in great part as an end in itself, with only cursory integration with others. This was due in part to a lack of a common understanding of counterinsurgency as a strategy and in part to the absence of organizational vehicles to orchestrate the component elements. The same comments can be made as to many of the countersubversion programs being conducted or assisted by U. S. agencies today. As noted above, this problem can be exacerbated by the inclusion of many of these programs in a general withdrawal from involvement abroad in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience.

6. In short, a new start is required to develop a countersubversion strategy appropriate to the requirements of the 1970's and the Nixon Doctrine. This should include the following steps:

- a. Intelligence analysis. An analysis should be made by the intelligence community of the likely threat of subversive forces to U. S. interests in the coming years.

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

This should include not only Communist forces but also other extremist elements. It should focus particularly on countries of importance to the United States and the possible manipulation of subversive activities therein by forces hostile to U. S. interests, whether Communist or aggressive neighbors. The status of countersubversive security forces should be examined in this analysis, as well as the economic and political terrain on which the contest may take place. In those areas where information is not currently adequate to provide a basis for judgment, requirements should be assigned for the collection of intelligence on the 'subversive "Order of Battle", capabilities and intentions, as well as those of the countersubversive forces.

b. Organizational responsibilities should be determined within the United States Government to carry out all parts of the program outlined in paragraph 3 above. A key action should be an assessment and recommendations by the U. S. Ambassador and Country Team in designated countries based on a general theme developed under NSC direction in Washington. This should highlight organizational responsibilities and ensure a comprehensive approach to the over-all

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

problem. Annual reports and assessments of the subversive and countersubversive situations should be required of the U. S. Mission in designated countries and of the U. S. agencies in Washington.

c. The importance of a strategic rather than an individual program approach to this problem should be asserted by NSC action and an appropriate NSC staff element. Individual agencies should be required to assign action offices to manage individual agency contributions to the comprehensive NSC strategy.


7. An important element of any countersubversion strategy would lie in the police field. As noted above, countersubversion involves more than police work, but certainly a police force must play a major role. Several U. S. agencies currently maintain relationships with foreign police forces, and in many cases provide assistance to countersubversion programs. Many of these have made useful contributions to U. S. interests over the years. However, this is particularly a field in which a new start on countersubversion would be fruitful, to separate it from the economic, military, and counterinsurgency environments in which it has been inundated. The attached memorandum (Foreign Police Forces - Opportunities in the 1970's) outlines a possible approach to this aspect of the problem.

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

8. In summary, a new start on countersubversion is necessary.



25X1

SECRET

SECRET

29 December 1971

FOREIGN POLICE FORCES - OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970's

1. The United States has long maintained relationships with the police forces of other nations. They include our contacts with the Latin American forces in the 1920's, the development of the Philippine Constabulary, post-World War II assistance to the Iranian National Police, the relationships with German and Japanese police under Allied occupation, and a variety of others. On 21 December 1954 National Security Council Action 1290-d marked a new chapter in these relationships. It sought to establish a consistent program of assistance to police and security forces in countries threatened with Communist subversion. Under this Action a number of programs were initiated. On 13 March 1957 the program was generalized into the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), which gradually over the following several years decentralized responsibility for these programs to individual missions and agencies.

2. In the early 1960's the concept of "Counterinsurgency" grew up to describe not only U. S. assistance to other national police and security forces but a broader attack on the problem of Communist insurgency. Included was a new emphasis on assistance to foreign police forces, supervised by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) under Presidential directive in NSAM 177 of 7 August 1962. Following

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2-

this, the Office of Public Safety was established in AID, and in the years since that time police assistance has become a regular element of the total U. S. effort in a number of countries.

3. One might conclude from the above outline that a full awareness of the importance of foreign police forces exists in the U. S. Government and that a comprehensive program of assistance to them has been developed over the years. In some degree and in some countries, this is certainly true. A number of effective programs of assistance to indigenous police forces have been carried out which have substantially assisted them to meet problems of Communist subversion. The Office of Public Safety has developed a corps of officers with police experience who have gone beyond the earlier image of retired U. S. police personnel to become specialists in police assistance programs in foreign nations. A large number of foreign police personnel have been trained at the International Police Academy or elsewhere, and the effect of this effort has in many cases been substantial in their home countries.

4. Despite these facts, there is an underlying (and essentially accurate) feeling that the program as a whole has never achieved anything like its maximum potential. Furthermore, it is once again faced with the prospect of decentralization and deemphasis. In part, this is a reflection of the question as to how effective it has been, and in part, it is an element of the general tendency to turn away from

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

the degree of U. S. engagement which marked the 1950's and the 1960's.

5. Before determining whether this is perhaps the correct development at this time, it is appropriate to examine the weaknesses and inadequacies of the program to date. In great part, these can be ascribed to organizational and bureaucratic problems within the United States Government.

6. Not having the strong colonial tradition of the British, Americans generally have not given the police role its full potential in our foreign assistance. Our relationships have primarily focused on political, economic, and military matters, with the police not clearly fitting into any one of these. The placement of the Police Program in AID has caused it to compete with economic development programs and has deprived it of the more substantial sums which might have been available in a security budget. In those areas in which the police has been included within military programs, however, there has been a tendency for it to be subordinated to the strengthening of local military forces. Further, there has not been a consistent appreciation of the police as a political force (for good or bad) in many nations, and of course, police abuses in some countries have discouraged American officials from involvement. While intelligence has been extracted from police elements in

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

some areas, this has tended to be a limited rather than a comprehensive exploitation of the police potential as a whole. In fact, a major difficulty has been a tendency for each agency to approach the police from its narrow point of view, so that a comprehensive strategy of U. S. contact with a police force has only rarely been developed. As a result, gaps in the U. S. approach have occurred, and the full potential has not been obtained.

25X1

7. Perhaps, however, the time for concern about foreign police forces has passed. Could we not merely accept the contribution made during the 1950's and 1960's by the various successful efforts, despite their gaps? Can it not be said that the reduction of American involvement abroad should quite properly be reflected in a phasedown of relationships with foreign police forces to information exchange and liaison through Interpol?

8. While certainly the question of scale of our relationship is appropriate for consideration, it appears incontestable that a continued and even improved relationship should exist with many police forces around the world. The world of the 1970's will certainly present problems on which an active police relationship could make a major contribution to the U. S. interests. An examination of this potential in various fields makes this clear:

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-5-

a. Subversion creating threats to U. S. interests in friendly countries will continue to be a problem during the 1970's, despite whatever progress may be made in limiting more overt and conventional types of warfare. In the multipolar world of the 1970's, in fact, subversion may even be a greater problem, stemming from multinational rivalries rather than the single Communist ideological center of the 1950's and the 1960's. Extremism under a variety of forms can threaten the stability and progress of friendly countries as well as build bases for penetration of the United States itself. The police role in identifying and counter-acting such subversion is as important today as it seemed to be during the many studies on the subject carried out during the 1950's and 1960's. Weaknesses in the execution of our program during those decades should not blind us nor cause us to despair of developing effective and comprehensive programs to meet this challenge today. In fact, the failures and mistakes, which show more clearly in hindsight, can perhaps awaken us to the need for better efforts in the 1970's.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-6-

25X1



d. In many areas it will be important that the National Police develop institutionally in a fashion acceptable to U. S. standards. Recipients of U. S. aid, allies, and others will be scrutinized by U. S. public opinion to determine whether reasonable standards of law and justice exist or are being developed. Other U. S. policies can be affected by failures in this respect, and frequently the National Police and judiciary of such nations must be the target of a campaign of upgrading to meet such

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-7-

standards. Failure to work with such National Police forces could cause our Government to lose options in other areas due to a failure in this.

9. Specifically, therefore, the following actions are required:

a. Review by the NSC Staff, or an interagency working group under an NSSM, of the present status of U. S. relationships with foreign police forces, and an outline of the objectives which should be sought in such relationships in the future. These might reiterate many of the points made in the studies of the 1950's and 1960's but add to them lessons such as the importance of effective Special Branch procedures, population control measures, improvements in judicial procedures, appropriate prison and detention standards, etc.

b. Definition of agency roles and relationships to provide a comprehensive guideline for relationships with foreign police forces. This might include such concepts as:

(1) State -- Policy direction of all police relationships; overt contacts, reporting, and influence on politically important national police authorities to propagate the rule of law.

(2) AID -- Advice and assistance on police organization, training, equipment, judicial procedures, prison

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-8-

procedures, etc., for the institutional development of the force as a whole.

(3) DOD -- Support to police paramilitary units; procedures for military assistance to police where required.

25X1

c. The U. S. missions in specified countries should be required to make a comprehensive report for the NSC on the police force of that country and its potential with respect to U. S. interests. Included in this report should be a clear definition of the respective responsibilities of each component agency of the country team, with an over-all review by the ambassador to ensure coverage of all aspects of the National Police potential. This report should be reviewed by the NSC staff to identify gaps or other problems needing correction.

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-9-

25X1




d. These mission reports, when approved, should be made the basis of specific programs to be developed by the various agencies. These programs would in turn be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget to ensure compliance with the over-all program of the NSC. An annual report by the interagency working group should be required as the basis of OMB review to ensure maximum coordination among the agencies prior to formal submission.

10. There is a general national inclination, which also affects the Government bureaucracy, to turn away from the subject of counter-insurgency and all its component elements as a result of the Vietnam experience. Resolution to avoid a repetition of Vietnam is certainly appropriate, but a refusal to learn its lessons could increase the likelihood of a similar difficulty or new problems in the future.



25X1

25X1



~~SECRET~~